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Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes the banks’ usage of Credit Default Swap. Although it is almost a new 
entry in the financial market, since its creation in the early 1990’s, it has been a well–known 
instrument, particularly in the subprime mortgages crisis the world talked a lot of that. 
Therefore, given its popularity, this topic has been worldwide broadly studied in the financial 
literature but with this work we want to contribute focusing in the domestic context. We develop 
our own dataset with eight Italian’s major banks for a period ranging from 2004 to 2018, with 
a concentration in testing two main hypothesis: capital relief or hedging instrument. 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset and we perform a Fixed Effect and Random 
Effect regression models. 
Results show evidence of banks using Credit Default Swap protection as capital relief 
instrument in all the specifications but results on the hedging hypothesis are ambiguous within 
the different statements and we deeply motivate this outcome. 
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Introduction 
 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) is one of the main protagonist of the financial markets in the 
recent turmoil and this has emphasized the necessity to better understand how it works and 
which are its implication for the policymaker, banks and other financial operators.  
We report as its date of born the years 1994 when J. P. Morgan first launched the Credit 
Default Swap. Originally, was created in order to have an instrument able to hedge the riskier 
exposures, i.e. an individual that lend money to third party, is exposed to the credit risk that this 
counterparty at the time of repayment is no longer able to fulfil his obligation. If such threat 
exists one may want to be protected from this possibility and the Credit Default Swap aims to 
do that. 
In particular, the CDS allows individual to buy a protection from whatever protection seller 
that is willing to sell that prevention from a counterparty’s risk of default. Where the 
counterparty is the entity with which the individual has made the contracts, lending or, 
generally, the agreements. 
On the other hand, in the most recent years, the types of use made of the Credit Default Swap 
protection have increased exponentially. In describing some of them, we mainly follow 
Aldasoro and Barth (2017) and Minton et al. (2008) who tested several hypothesis other than 
the hedging and capital relief ones, such as the private information example, which asserts that 
banks in some lending exposures may have sensible private information on the borrowers and 
create information asymmetries that affect the actual and original use of CDS, turning it into a 
speculative instrument. 
Therefore, in this dissertation we focus only on two of them and we construct our own dataset 
that contains 8 Italian banks, considered in the time–window of fourteen years, from 2004 to 
2018. We construct a measure of the share of the loan that banks lend to their customer (either 
individual, firms or other banks) that remains uninsured, in particular, we calculate the portion 
of the bank’ exposure that is not protected by a CDS contract.  
In that way we apply the model to our sample and perform a panel data regression model 
with a Within Group, Between Effect and Random Effect regressions of the data. 
We contribute to the existing literature by analysing data before and during the financial 
crisis for the Italian major banks.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, we present an overview of 
the Credit Default Swap instrument deepening in its use, regulation, function and popularity 
from its first implementation. In Chapter 2, we present specifically the relationship between 
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banks and our interesting instrument, reviewing the past literature’ hypothesis and the results 
obtained in order to have an idea of the variety of uses that has been made of the Credit Default 
Swap. In this Chapter we also emphasize the role of the Rating Agencies in determining the 
credit risk of the counterparty, an essential and extremely useful valuation if a bank want to 
have an external estimate of the counterparty’s probability of default. 
Finally, in Chapter 3 we describe the data we use and present the empirical set–up of our 
analysis together with the corresponding comments on the results we find out. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1 Credit Default Swap 
 
In this Chapter, a brief introduction and overview of the Credit Default Swap contract are 
going to be provided; underlying its functioning, historical trend, but even some problems 
related to its implementation. 
 
 
 
1.1 Credit Default Swap definition 
 
In 1994, J.P. Morgan, a leader in financial services, first launched a Credit Default Swap 
contract (CDS) with the aim to protect its credit risk exposure to Exxon. At that time J.P. 
Morgan handles the exposure by paying a fee to the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, which was willing to sell protection. This is exactly the way in which a CDS 
works: it acts as an insurance contract offering protection against the default of a referenced 
sovereign government, corporation, or structured entity (Augustin et al., 2014). 
Technically speaking, a CDS is a contract accessory to a loan or other instruments and 
techniques, particularly is a fixed income derivative instrument, that permits a protection buyer 
to purchase insurance against a credit event, that may happen, on an underlying reference entity, 
by paying an annuity premium to the protection seller.  
We refer to this annuity premium as the CDS spread, over the life of the contract, usually 
defined as a percentage of the notional amount insured (or in basis points) that can be paid in 
quarterly or semi–annual instalments. For example, if there are some suspect on a company’ 
creditworthiness (i.e. on your reference entity) you would be incentivised to buy a CDS 
protection on that company. Then, if some default event occurs, like the company fail to meet 
its obligations for any of a predetermined set of its debt claims, it would trigger the payout from 
the entity that has sold you the CDS contract (i.e. the protection seller). Clearly, the higher is 
the insolvency risk perceived by the market, the higher will be the premium charged on the 
instrument.  
 13 
The majority of credit event considered able to trigger the payment are reference entity 
bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration, repudiation and moratorium.  
Actually, the Credit Default Swap often incorporates a specific class of the firm’s capital 
structure, such as the senior, unsecured, or junior debt obligations of the company and 
references a particular amount of the insured debt, is defined as the notional amount. 
The transaction’s terms and conditions, including its maturity date and which credit events 
are covered by the contract, are defined in the trade “Confirmation”. Standard Confirmations 
reference the 2003 ISDA – International Swaps and Derivatives Association – credit derivatives 
definitions (the “Definitions”) and supplements are contained in the May 2003 Supplement and 
the 2009 ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, Auction Settlement and 
Restructuring Supplement. These provide the basic framework for Credit Default Swap 
contracts and provide the standard set of definitions and provisions that govern the majority of 
CDS transactions. The aim of this document is to outline and discuss the most salient points 
(Credit Suisse, 2011). All this, just mentioned, documentation will be further analyzed in the 
following Sections. 
Generally, Credit Default Swap not only aims to provide protection from exposure to risks 
but rather, it expresses, a positive or negative credit view (i.e. valuation of the creditworthiness) 
on a single entity or a portfolio of entities, independent of any other exposures to the entity one 
might have. Indeed, exist also the so called “naked CDS”, a derivative contract for which having 
an actual credit risk exposure toward a reference entity is not a necessary condition; thus, for 
instance, a third party that wants to buy a CDS protection on the default of a company, can do 
it without having any type of credit risk exposure with this company. 
Moreover, a CDS is a bilateral contract traded Over the Counter (not regulated markets). 
Trades in CDS markets face therefore, some impediments besides the default risk such as 
information asymmetries, transaction costs, searching costs, funding costs, etc. (Kamga et al., 
2017). 
This characteristics of the CDS contracts, indeed, have created a lot of problems and we go 
through them in Section 1.3 and also in Section 1.2.4 where the regulation behind these issues, 
mainly in term of transparency and information, are taken into consideration. 
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1.2 History of instrument 
 
1.2.1 Origins of Credit Default Swap 
 
As already said the first–time adoption of a Credit Default Swap contract date back to 1994 
when J.P. Morgan1 created a CDS. Of course, is a very recent discovery but, despite is almost 
a novelty for financial markets, many strategic uses of the instrument have been made in several 
different manners.  
However, Figure 1.1 presents a timeline for the Credit Default Swap market from its born 
date until 2014, twenty years of changes for this new market. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Timeline of the major developments in the CDS market from 1994 to 20142. 
 
 
 
 
1 J.P. Morgan Chase and Co. is an American multinational investment bank and financial services company 
headquartered in New York City. 
2 Source: Augustin P., Subrahmanyam M. G., Tang D. Y. and Wang, S. Q. (2014). Credit default swaps: A 
survey, Foundations and Trends in Finance. 
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As the figure suggests, only after five years from the first implementation there was the 
ISDA standardization of the instrument which was then revised later on in 2001. ISDA 
framework has become the most relevant standard for documenting Credit Default Swap 
transactions both at the national and international levels. ISDA – The International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association is an association created and managed in order to guarantee supervision 
and regulation over the derivative contracts subscribed in Over the Counter markets. The 
contracts established by ISDA are defined as “ISDA Master Agreement”.  
That Master Agreement refers to a contract between two counterparties that often pre–exists 
the CDS transaction in which they are about to enter. The master agreement governs the legal 
aspects in the relationship between parties that are not specific to the CDS transaction at hand, 
highlighting also the procedures related to the default event (Bomfim, 2005). 
In the early 2000s, the market was growing sensationally until 2007, then something 
happened in 2008, the Lehman bankruptcy and the conditions changed dramatically. In the 
following paragraph, a more detailed and complete picture of the historical trend of the Credit 
Default Swap contract is provided. 
More importantly, originally CDS were created for hedging purpose, indeed the primary 
objective of J.P. Morgan was to transfer the credit risk exposure that it had toward Exxon. But 
then, as time passed, the reasons why the instrument has been used, changed a lot and took 
various forms and banks, in particular, were the dominant players in the market, as CDS were 
primarily used to hedge risk in connection with its lending activities. This is one of the main 
reasons why our focus will be on the relationship between banks and the credit derivative 
instrument, which will be analyzed better in the Second Chapter. We further concentrate our 
attention on Single–name CDS, which definition is given in the next Section, since, as pointed 
out by Augustin et al. in 2014, most of the studies on Credit Default Swap market focus on the 
Single–name segment, this guarantee comparability with available studies. 
 
 
 
1.2.2 Characteristics of CDS 
 
The CDS market, generally speaking, could be segmented into two components: 
• Single–name CDS: which are credit derivatives, where the reference entity is a specific 
debtor such as a non–financial corporation, a bank/dealer, or a sovereign (e.g. 
government bonds);  
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• Multi–name CDS: which incorporates index CDS, tranced index CDS and others, refer 
instead, on contracts where the reference entity is composed of more than one. 
 
The main difference between the two regards the protection premium. Entering a portfolio 
of Single–name CDS means bear each single fair–market premium, instead in the Multi–name 
all the contracts share the same premium where the premium is established at base date and is 
set to have a net present value near zero; then, as the spread moves, the NPV became higher or 
lower than zero. Figure 1.2 plots the time series notional amount of both Single and Multi–
name Credit Default Swap. 
The most common CDS indices are those managed by the Markit group, which include 
indexes on European issuers with the most liquid Single–name CDS (iTraxx indices) and those 
covering US issuers (CDX indices). The growing diffusion of CDS indices depends on the fact 
that they offer a simple and immediate tool, especially for institutional investors, to cover the 
credit exposure on a portfolio of securities with a single transaction. 
Credit Default Swap can even be referenced against customized exposure levels based on 
specific client demands: for example, can provide protection against the first $1 millions of 
realized credit losses in a $10 million portfolio of exposure. Such structures are commonly 
known as tranche of CDS. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Notional amounts of Single–name and Multi–name CDS outstanding. 
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Deeply in Table 1.1 is presented the time series of the notional amounts outstanding of the 
total credit derivative in circulation (where H1 and H2 stand for first and second semester of 
the year) with the relative portion of CDSs in order to demonstrate their undeniable relevance, 
indeed from 2007 onward, CDS instruments represent almost 80/90% of the total credit 
derivatives.  
We retrieved these data from the source of Bank for International Settlements (BIS)3 that 
provides information about Credit Default Swap from the second semester of 2004 and we 
rearranged them in a way that emphasize specific elements. Indeed, another evidence that this 
table highlights is the fact that, overall, the Single–name Credit Default Swap represents the 
great component of the total notional amounts of Credit Default Swap in circulation, roughly 
always above the 50% of the total CDS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was established in 1930 and it’s an international financial 
institution owned by 60 central banks which has the aim to serve central banks in their persuit of monetary and 
financial stability, to foster international cooperation and act as bank for central banks. 
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Table 1.1 Notional amounts of total credit derivative and CDS outstanding. 
 19 
Credit events 
 
One of the most important characteristics of CDS as mentioned above is the definition of the 
credit event that triggers the payout. A detailed classification is provided by the Credit 
Derivatives Definitions in 1999, supplemented in 2001. However, is not sufficient recognize 
which are these credit event, but they must satisfy a minimum requirement in order to be 
qualified as a trigger event. For instance, the event should not be occasionally but has to persist 
for some time; more, it has to be notified and verified by a source of information like Bloomberg 
or Thomson Reuters.  
A brief description of each event, that recall the one provided by the Credit Derivative 
Definitions, is given by Bomfim in 2005 and is the following:  
• Failure to pay; 
• Bankruptcy: is a condition where the reference entity becomes unable to repay the debt. 
This credit event doesn’t apply to CDS written on sovereign entity; 
• Restructuring: occurs when the term of the obligation change. Actually, Restructuring 
conventions differ between corporate and sovereign CDS contracts, from American and 
European companies and, even, among sub and senior European insurance Credit 
Default Swap contracts. It is therefore important to know what conventions are 
applicable and the implications (details in Section 1.2.3); 
• Obligation acceleration: is a situation in which the payment is required earlier with 
respect to the previously established date; 
• Repudiation or moratorium: is deemed to have occurred when the reference entity 
rejects or challenges the validity of its obligations. 
 
 
 
Settlement following credit events 
 
Furthermore, when a credit event occurs (i.e. the event that causes the payout of the seller), 
the buyer of protection stops to pay the spread (which represents the periodically payments due 
from the buyer to the seller for the entire contract life) in the last coupon payment date before 
the credit event and the seller of the protection has to deliver the notional amount of the Credit 
Default Swap contract.  
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That settlement of Credit Default Swap may be either physical or in cash. The choice of 
settlement method is specified in the Confirmation letter, which is part of the CDS 
documentation that specifies the identity of the reference entity, the notional amount (also 
known as “fixed rate payer calculation amount”) of the contract and the protection premium, 
more, it also determines the types of debt securities that can be delivered in the case of 
physically settled contracts.  
Indeed, physical delivery requires the payment of the notional price against the delivery of 
the referenced activity (bond or loan). On the contrary, in case of cash settlement of the Credit 
Default Swap contract, the amount paid is the difference among notional price and its market 
price at the date of the settlement. More, cash–settled Credit Default Swap contracts are more 
common in the European Union rather than in the United States, where physical settlement is 
the method of choice.  
Overall, initially, credit events were resolved via physical settlement, thus by delivering a 
bond to the protection’s seller for par value. That worked well as long as the holder of the CDS 
held the underlying bond and the instrument was mainly used as hedging derivative, but things, 
at some point, changed and from a hedging tool the CDS moved to be a betting instrument, thus 
then the physic delivery became difficult to implement. 
However, an important consideration is that, in the credit event situation, the buyer of 
protection (short risk) delivers bonds and/or loans (in case of physical delivery and its face 
amount equal to the notional amount of the CDS) of the defaulted reference entity and receives 
par from the seller (long risk).  
Therefore, additional risk to the protection buyer is that the protection seller may not be able 
to pay the full par amount upon default. This risk, referred to us as counterparty credit risk and, 
following Beinstein and Scott (2006), it is determined as the par value less the recovery rate, 
where the recovery rate here is the difference between the face value of the Credit Default Swap 
contract and the price at which bonds or loans delivered are traded when CDS contracts are 
settled. 
 
 
 
Maturities 
 
Another distinction is made by the maturities. Although the negotiation takes place Over the 
Counter, therefore creating a range for personalization of the contract, the maturities of a Credit 
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Default Swap are quite standard. Hence CDSs may have a maturity of one, five, seven or ten 
years. 
The most commonly used, thus the relevant component of CDS in circulation, are those with 
a scheduled termination date of five years. They represent the most liquid tenors among all 
outstanding credit derivatives. Moreover, the coupon payments could occur every trimester, 
semester or on yearly basis, despite the one with the payment every 3 months is the widely 
used, which by convention take place on the following date: 20 March, 20 June, 20 September 
and 20 December.   
 
 
 
1.2.3 Historical trend 
 
In the years following its inception, the Credit Default Swap market saw a steady increase 
in volumes followed by a rapid surge in growth up to the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. 
The size of the market and the role it played in the crisis led to calls for strengthened 
transparency and resilience (Aldasoro et al., 2018).  
On the contrary, the reverse trend characterizing the period after the subprime crisis, there 
was a particularly felt decrease in confidentiality about financial markets which in turn triggered 
the less willing to take risks by operators. Especially, after the mandatory disclosure required 
by the new regulation of that time, which figure out what the bubble was hidden. 
Before going directly to the consequences, let’s recall all the salient moments, indeed by the 
end of 2004 the total gross notional amount of CDS outstanding was roughly 6 $ trillion, as can 
be seen from Figure 1.3, instead, just prior the financial crisis the amount reached was almost 
60 $ trillion, thus 10 times the prior evaluation. That was a period of strong development for 
the instrument, people and organizations started using it not only such a hedging tool, as was 
the idea behind its creation, but also for speculation purposes, for exploiting insider information 
gained from lending relationship4 or, even, for a more aggressive behaviour in terms of risk–
taking (Aldasoro et al., 2017). 
The following data and figures are all retrieved from Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) and present the patterns for all CDS’ instrument types (i.e. both Single–name and Multi–
name CDS). 
 
4Acharya and Johnson (2007) found out that with private information on loan quality, banks have an 
incentive to give more bad loans, provided they can then perform credit risk transfer via, for instance, CDS. 
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Figure 1.3 shows the total gross notional amount of Credit Default Swaps outstanding over 
the last 14 years from 2004 to 2018 (the amounts are in Trillion). 
 
Figure1.3: Notional amounts of Credit Default Swap outstanding. 
 
 
 
In the second half of 2007, as already mentioned, the notional amounts of CDS was 61.24 $ 
trillion, while in the first semester of 2018 reached almost the pre–crisis level. In terms of 
notional amounts outstanding, the market has seen a continuous decline after that peak in 2007 
indeed declined up to 8.35 $ trillion.  
The major events that marked the Credit Default Swap trend depicted in Figure 1.3 are now 
described. Market shocks like the Conseco Finance restructuring in 2000, the 2008 AIG bailout 
and the 2012 Greek default all contributed to shaping the formalization of Credit Default Swap 
contracts.  
The Conseco Finance restructuring is a consequence of one of the main documentation issue 
in the history of the credit derivatives market, i.e. the definition of restructuring as a credit 
event. Specifically, the restructuring, among the credit events, is the one that has created more 
problems and was pointed out by Conseco.  
In September 2000, Conseco (an American insurance company) lengthen the deadline on 
some loan and consequently modified the coupons.  
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That initiative caused the trigger of the credit event which, de facto, did not translate into 
unfavourable consequences for holders of debt. Rather, the protection buyer gained both from 
the payout of the CDS and, more, from the debt restructuring.  
That episode caused the ISDA to take care of the argument that indeed defined some type of 
contract. Hence, the Credit Default Swap contract could trade with four different Restructuring 
conventions; first, the so–called “No R” which do not recognised the restructuring as a credit 
event; second, the “Old R” that do recognise the restructuring as possible trigger event and the 
settlement is as the one of the other credit events, thus without any limitation of the type of 
bond to deliver; third, “Mod–R” introduced in 2001, is a version of the Restructuring credit 
event where the instruments eligible for delivery is restricted (i.e. only those with a maturity 
equal or less than 30 months from the restructuring date); finally, the “Mod–Mod–R” (i.e. the 
Modified Modified Restructuring) that was established in 2003 and is similar to the Mod–R 
except for allowing a slightly larger range of deliverable obligations in the case of a 
restructuring event, thus extended to bond with a maturity up to 60 months after the 
restructuring. 
More, as preannounced, the great recession in 2007–2009 contributed to the reduction in the 
notional amount, indeed it has led to a simultaneous decrease of both Single–name and Multi–
name CDS. In the aftermath of this well–known event is evident that started a sentiment of fear 
with a consequent compression of credit derivative contracts, especially CDS which are the 
plain vanilla of that type of derivative instruments.  
Actually, there still exists a discussion about why during the great financial crisis Lehman 
Brothers wasn’t helped, while other institutions like Bear Sterns or AIG were saved. 
In particular, the American International Group (AIG) was an American society which by 
the end of 2007 was heavily exposed in CDS market and used a great part of the premium 
received in order to reinvest money in Mortgage–Backed Securities (MBS), bond deriving from 
the securization of mortgages.  
Initially, return as a profitable procedure but then, once there was the burst of the Subprime 
mortgages bubble and the default of Lehman Brothers, dealers who previously asked to the 
insurance company AIG protection, at that point in time started to ask for even more protection 
but the company was no longer able to provide it. Thus, the crush and the subsequent decision 
to save AIG demonstrates the relevance of the complexity and opacity behind the Credit Default 
Swap market: Lehman was a major CDS buyer, on which a substantial amount of protection 
had been sold, among others by AIG. At that time, consequential policy decisions were taken, 
despite authorities’ limited knowledge regarding the structure of counterparty credit exposures 
and CDS protection sold. 
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Just after the “subprime crisis phase”, the CBOE VIX5 peaks, the Credit Default Swap 
default premium also peaks. Thus, in this period of fragile financial markets, with weak funding 
conditions, high risk aversion and high credit risk, investors were less confident, less optimistic 
and shy away from risky assets.  
Around 2010, the credit quality of several European countries crumbles, leading to their 
downgrade. This casts doubt on the capacity of governments to stabilize the–financial market, 
investors became less inclined to sell insurance against increasing default risk and supply less 
protection (Kamga et al., 2017).   
More, another scandalous event that marked the CDS history was the 2012 J. P. Morgan 
“London Whale” CDS trading loss. London Whale was the nickname of a well–known trader, 
the Chief Investment Officer of J.P. Morgan, Bruno Iksil. He had his popularity to the large 
positions on Credit Default Swap investment, the same condition that makes him fail in his 
objective that, as CIO of the bank, was to hold down the bank’s risk level. Iksil used 350 $ 
billion to invest (much of it derived from federally insured deposits) and become a money 
maker, with its London’s office focused on complex derivative trades that had less and less to 
do with hedging (as reported by Bloomberg LP in 2013); the estimated loss from the operation 
was about 6.2 $ billion. 
An international episode, that has made the world talk about Credit Default Swap market 
again in recent years, was the Greece default. That circumstance remarked the fact that there is 
huge speculation behind its market and more importantly, shed light on what was considered 
up to that moment an innocuous instrument, the CDS, to be a very dangerous one.  
American banks were sellers of protection and should guarantee the payout in case of 
Greece’ default, hence, the creditors of the state’s debt felt safe, but this was a huge error. Since 
when the moment in which the protection sellers had to pay, i.e. when the default event 
occurred, they did not. The circumstance considered by Fitch as the trigger credit event was the 
cut of 50% of the nominal value of Greece’ sovereign bond.  
The ISDA established that there should not be the repayment of the Credit Default Swap 
which, in this situation became a useless insurance instrument, since it fails in its objective and 
creditors lost a lot of money. The motivation by ISDA was that the event wasn’t an actual credit 
event since there was a voluntary intention of restructuring the debt of Greece with a consistent 
haircut of the debt. A paradoxical situation that could effectively undermine the credibility of 
 
5 The CBOE VIX is a Volatility Index (i.e. VIX) created by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). It 
is a real–time market index that represents the market's expectation of 30–day forward–looking volatility. 
Derived from the price inputs of the Standard and Poor 500 index options, it provides a measure of market risk 
and investors' sentiments. 
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the derivative market and contribute to the incessant decline in Credit Default Swap gross 
notional amount. 
At this point, a remarkable and detailed study of the regulation behind CDS should be made, 
but before deeply investigate all the concerns of this wide theme is important to focus on a 
characterizing feature: the main counterparties sectors (shown in Figure 1.4). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Notional amounts of Single–name CDS divided by sector outstanding. 
 
 
 
Yet from a first look is evident that the market is highly concentrated: most trades relate to 
a few reference entities, which in turn account for a large share of gross notional amounts. 
Dealers occupy the lion’s share of transactions and associated net and gross notional. Overall, 
the dealers have a small net/gross ratio, reflecting their intermediation role (ESRB–European 
Systemic Risk Board, 2016).   
Specifically, over the life–cycle of the instrument the two main counterparties sectors are 
“Banks and securities firms” and “Other financial institution” even if in the after–crisis period, 
“Central Counterparties (CCPs)6” began a great component, mostly due to the wide regulation 
 
6 See paragraph 1.2.4. 
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issue. Regulation that deeply affected the CDS market, changing thus, the entity of the 
counterparties in the contracts. However, “Other financial institutions”, “Non–financial 
corporations”, as well as “Insurance and financial guaranty firms” are generally net buyers of 
protection. 
Hence, from the end of the 1990s, banks have been, among the others, the largest buyers of 
credit protection and insurance companies are among the biggest sellers. This market has 
exploded with great importance and influence in financial markets. 
 
 
 
1.2.4 Regulation 
 
An in–depth in regulation is made necessary, particularly after the financial crisis, when the 
market started to realize that the deregulation of the Over the Counter (OTC) markets were a 
weak point for the negotiation of the instrument. For instance, the possibility to trade with a 
stranger, the absence of transparency, the shortcoming of regulation and protection pointed out 
the need to find some new rules of the game or other implementations that could help the market 
to give more guarantees and protection to counterparties.  
Consequently, innovation in this direction have been made and the growth of the regulation 
becomes, indeed, a key factor in the changes in the CDS market, starting from the ISDA Master 
Agreement of 1999, which was updated in 2001–2002, in order to provide Over the Counter 
(OTC) counterparties with a fully documented, yet flexible, contract as a basis for negotiating 
the derivatives transactions; followed by a further standardization, in the post–crisis period, 
with the implementation of the CDS “Big Bang” and CDS “Small Bang” protocols in 2009 for 
the United State of America and for the European Union.  
The primary objective of these new regulations was to bring alterations in the contract and 
trading conventions and particularly to improve the efficiency and transparency of the Credit 
Default Swap markets due to the fact that the CDS contracts are traded in Over the Counter 
markets.  
One change of the “Big Bang” of April 2009 was the standardization of the coupon 
payments. Therefore, the fixed coupon payments for Single–name CDS were established to be 
both 100 and 500 basis points, whereby any difference relative to the running par spread would 
be settled through an upfront payment, which helped to equalise contracts referred to the same 
reference entity and make things more comparable.  
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It, also, allows Credit Default Swap contracts to have the Determinations Committees which 
make binding determinations in connection with credit and succession events, including 
whether or not to hold an auction to settle CDS contracts following the occurrence of the credit 
event.  
Further harmonisation was made on the side of a default determination, again, in order to 
reduce the creation of disparity on similar contracts, for instance, to avoid that a certain credit 
event may trigger the payment in one case and may not in an analogous one, as reported by BIS 
in 2010. While the Small Bang protocol offered a second and last possibility for the parties to 
adhere to the Big Bang protocol, indeed by accepting the Small Bang, a party that did not adhere 
to the Big Bang will be deemed to have adhered also to the Big Bang one.  
Despite these improvements in CDS’ standardisation and the widespread use of risk–
mitigation techniques such as compression, outstanding notional amounts from bilateral 
exposures were still large. For this reason, Credit Default Swaps represent an important source 
of counterparty risk.  
Nowadays that type of risk is absorbed by CCPs and also several safety buffers have been 
put in place for reducing it, such as default funds, multiple levels of margin requirements, equity 
and reserve requirements for CCPs. Where CCP stands for “Central Counterparty Clearing”, it 
is a corporate entity that reduces counterparty, operational, settlement, market, legal and default 
risk for traders. Acting as counterparty to buyers and sellers, CCP guarantees the terms of a 
trade even if one party defaults on the agreement. The Central Counterparty either clear and 
settle the trading between counterparties. 
By the end of 2013, Credit Default Swap contracts with central clearing accounted for 26% 
of all gross notional amounts of CDS outstanding (data retrieved by the Bank for International 
Settlements). 
Improvements in regulation did not stop at that point in time, hence new acts came into the 
picture.  
Importantly, in 2010 the Dodd–Frank Act mandates that certain standard OTC derivatives 
must be traded on Swap Execution Facilities (SEFs). This went under the name of MAT 
mandate. (Riggs et al., 2018). The main purpose was to restore public confidence on these types 
of instruments and markets.  
The Dodd–Frank Act wanted by Obama, was created particularly for the American market 
which, following this law, became subject to various supervision and intervention by the SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) and the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission). 
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Concerning Europe and according to EMIR, all EU–located legal persons (counterparties) 
entering into a derivative contract must report the details of that contract to a trade repository 
(TR) authorised by ESMA. Specifically, the authorised trade repositories are CME, DTCC, 
ICE7, KDPW, Regis-TR and UnaVista Limited.  
These six Trade Repositories provide daily data to over 60 institutions in the EU, which have 
access to the data pertaining to their respective jurisdiction.  
The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) is an American company that 
provides clearance, settlement and information services to financial markets. It offers a huge 
dataset of information, simplifying the complexities of data management across transaction 
types and asset classes, increasing transparency, mitigating risk and driving efficiencies for 
financial firms, as reported in the website. DTCC in March 2010, gave greater access to CDS 
data in order, indeed, to achieve more transparency although it still remains a flaw for Credit 
Default Swap.  
 
 
 
1.3 Advantages and disadvantages of CDS 
 
Given the complexity and the low level of transparency in OTC derivatives markets, Credit 
Default Swaps has represented a widely recognised source of systemic risk and still do it. In 
particular, the great and various use that has been made of the contract and the fact that the 
transaction in OTC markets are not so clear as it should, have let the world to be divided into 
two factions, those who believe CDS is a “good” instrument and others who even perceive it as 
one of the causes of the 2008’ financial crisis. 
Indeed, Augustin et al. in 2014 asserted that while the CDS’ proponents defend them as 
efficient vehicles with which to transfer and manage credit risk as well as means to widen the 
investment opportunity set, their opponents denounce them as “poisonous”, “toxic”, “time 
bombs”, “financial hydrogen bombs” or even “speculative bets” that influence government 
default. 
 
7 With approximately 4 million contracts cleared every day across multiple asset classes, ICE Clear Europe is 
one of the world’s most diverse and leading clearing houses. It provides central counterparty clearing and risk 
management services for interest rate, equity index, agricultural and energy derivatives, as well as European 
credit default swaps (CDS). As part of ICE strategy to provide clearing services in the regulatory jurisdictions 
and time zones where you do business, they offer secure, capital-efficient clearing, risk management and 
physical delivery services through ICE Clear Europe. To help mitigate systemic risk and protect the interests of 
ICE’s clearing members and customers, ICE Clear Europe holds $35 billion in its financial guarantee package 
(guarantee fund) and is regulated by the Bank of England in the U.K. and by the SEC and CFTC in the U.S. 
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Negotiation concluded with a phone call is just an example that makes reflect on how much 
of opacity there is behind the transaction in the Over the Counter market. This is scary since no 
one knows the exact conditions and quantity of each trade as soon as it occurs; the solution that 
the opponent sustain is a complete regulation, transparency of the instrument throughout the 
creation of regulated exchanges.  
Actually, without knowing much of the CDS market, transaction and the great notional 
amount in circulation make thing even harder to understand, thus a trader no longer 
distinguishes where this huge amount is due to an increase of the spread because of the increase 
in the risk perceived or it is just a bubble.  
A strategy applied to CDS that may result in a bubble and has been largely applied to the 
instrument is the so–called “Netting strategy8” is considered one of the cons for the instrument 
itself. Specifically, this practice consists of taking the risk by selling a CDS contract and, on 
the other hand, on protecting from the same risk by buying, meanwhile, a protection CDS; that 
procedure allows, the former seller (that becomes buyer in the second operation) to offset the 
risk (i.e. netting the position), in that way, he may earn something by charging a higher premium 
when it acts as seller of the protection and pay a lower premium as buyer of CDS. It’s easy to 
understand that this procedure could possibly be repeated for an indefinite number of times, 
thus the person, or the entity, that has sold for last the CDS protection could, in turn, buy from 
another one a credit derivative protection and so on.  
That strategy works until some of these netting operators’ defaults, hence when he is no 
longer able to meet his obligation, at this point the chain breaks.  
Particularly, this example shed light on one characteristic of the Credit Default Swap market, 
the interconnection that disrupt in any part of it and could cause ripple effects throughout the 
entire system. 
Moreover, another unfavourable consequence of using Credit Default Swap perhaps is due 
to the intervention of government in the financial market. Specifically, the rescue of AIG from 
the Federal Reserve, the Germany providing bailout to the Hypo Real Estate or, even, Belgium, 
France and Luxemburg providing 150 € billion of guarantee for Dexia’s debt, all this events 
and other, point out the governments’ responses to financial crisis aim at supplying liquidity 
and at decreasing systemic risk in the market, which in turn should lower the CDS prices.  
 
8 For more detail visit: https://www.learningmarkets.com/netting-and-credit-default-swaps/ 
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As emphases by Kamga et al. in 2017, yet noticed by Archarya et al. in 2010, these 
government interventions, on one hand, stabilize financial markets, but on the other hand, they 
allow the transmission of risk from the financial sector to sovereigns. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2 Bank–Credit Default Swap relationship 
 
We notice, from past studies, that Credit Default Swap positions are quite large compared to 
the direct credit exposure of the Credit Default Swap’s reference entities and usually banks tend 
to sell more credit protection than what they acquire against counterparties in their loan, bond 
and securities portfolios, which is the opposite of what one would expect if the only reason to 
use that derivative contract were to hedge credit risk. 
For these reasons, before getting into the detail of our empirical work, we want to present 
credit risk and the several uses of the instrument identified in the past, then focus on some of 
them that we adopt to carry on the analysis and, more, we want to review some evidence coming 
from past literature on analogous works. 
 
 
 
2.1 Credit risk 
 
Among all the possible motivation that could create difficulties to banks or, even, lead to a 
deterioration and defaults, there is one fundamental cause that has played and still play a key 
role. We are talking about credit risk. This is the reason why Credit Default Swap originally 
born: to hedge credit risk. 
Credit risk is defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as “the 
potential that a bank borrower, or counterparty, will fail to meet its payment obligations 
regarding the terms agreed with the bank. It includes both uncertainties involved in repayment 
of the bank’s dues and repayment of dues on time”.9 
It is calculated based on some borrower’s characteristics in order to determine he/she’s 
ability to repay the debt according with the terms agreed. For instance, to assess credit risk on 
a consumer loan, banks have to check out some borrower’s specific feature like credit history, 
 
9 https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs54.pdf 
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capacity to repay, capital that own, the loan's condition terms and, if present, the associated 
collateral. 
 
Historically, during the subprime crisis, many banks made significant losses in the value of 
loans granted to high–risk borrowers. Indeed, at that time banks made loans to everybody, even 
to persons that were not able at all to repay the obligations.  
Major banks all over the globe suffered similar losses due to incorrectly assessing the 
likelihood of default on mortgage payments. This inability to assess or respond correctly to 
credit risk resulted in companies and individuals around the world losing a lot of money. 
 
Nobody can, in advance, know exactly who will default on obligations, in which amount 
and when it will occur but, despite the evident difficulties in assessing that, banks could 
manage credit risk by creating provisions at the time of disbursing loan. 
Most of them are regulated by the capital requirement for credit risk, which establishes the 
portion of capital that banks need to keep as deposit in order to face possible failure in debt 
repayment from customers. 
In particular, the first pillar of Basel III establishes that institutions shall at all times satisfy 
the following own funds requirements: 
• Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5%; 
• Tier 1 capital ratio of 6%; 
• Total capital ratio of 8%.   
expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount. 
 
The determinant of this risk is obviously to be found in the fundamentals of the subject or 
entity itself, in particular in its economic, financial and equity situation. 
In that way one should be able to determine the repayment capacity and creditworthiness of 
the bank’s counterparty in the daily transactions.  
The measurement of credit risk is of fundamental importance for the formation of the price 
of a bond and there is various method to assess the risk in question. The most common 
indicators of creditworthiness can be divided into two main categories: 
- Direct indicators; 
- Indirect indicators. 
Direct indicators are characterized by the proposition of an explicit and immediately 
perceptible representation of credit risk, the so–called rating. 
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The rating is a summary judgment assigned by the banks, either an internal rating and/or an 
external rating by specialized companies (i.e. the rating agencies), on the reliability of the 
borrower translated into an alphanumeric symbol referring to a specific scale of values divided 
by class.  
The analysis is either quantitative and qualitative style in which various economic factors 
are taken into consideration, including: the prospect of future earnings and future cash flows, 
the capital structure, the debt characteristics, the level of liquidity, the situation in the country, 
the market situation, the industrial sector in which the company in question operates, the quality 
of the managerial class and other information.  
Indirect indicators have completely different characteristics from those of direct indicators. 
In fact, these do not derive from any analytical assessment process of creditworthiness and, to 
the contrary, reflect the expectations of market operators, being an implicit measure of credit 
risk. They are identified with the prices of financial instruments whose pricing model reflects 
market assessments of the creditworthiness of the companies issuing the bonds.  
Ascertained the relevance of this type of risk, banks have always to be prepared to face it. 
Thus, banks exploit Rating Agencies to help them self–establish the credit risk level of each 
counterparty. 
In particular, banks may choose between two methodologies for calculating their capital 
requirement for credit risk: 
- The standardized approach; 
- The IRB approach: foundation and advanced approach. 
 
Under the standardized approach the credit risk is enhanced by means of, first, a 
segmentation of exposures into seventeen types, then the use of ratings issued by export credit 
agencies (ECAs) or specialized external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) recognized for 
this purpose by the supervisory authorities. Where with the ECAIs is intended the above cited 
rating agencies. 
Whereby, the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach is a more advanced approach that uses 
several variables for the estimation of the Probability of Default (PD) such as the LGD (Loss 
Given Default), EAD (Exposure At Default) and the Maturity, 
Where for PD we intend the probability that a counterparty will default within a 
preestablished time horizon (generally one year); for LGD, the expected value of the ratio 
between the loss due to default and the amount of the exposure at time of default; for EAD, the 
value of on–balance and off–balance exposures and finally, for Maturity, the average, for a 
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given exposure of the residual contractual maturities of the payments due, each weighted by its 
amount. 
The IRB method may be divided into two approaches, the foundation and the advanced ones, 
which differ a little each other but both have the aim to get an estimation of the Probability of 
Default of the counterparty.   
 
 
 
2.2 Rating Agencies  
 
Rating Agencies are independent private companies committed to assess the 
creditworthiness of states, bonds and issuers active on the market with the aim to translate that 
assessment into a synthetic parameter that is easily understandable.  
 
Albeit their diffusion around the world, the most important Rating Agencies are: 
• Fitch Rating Ltd.;  
• Moody’s Investor Service Inc.;  
• Standard and Poor’s Financial Services LLC. 
 
Bond credit–Rating Agencies, such as Moody's Investors Services and Fitch Ratings, 
evaluate the credit risks of thousands of corporate bond issuers and municipalities on an 
ongoing basis.  
In fact, as preannounced, they translate their evaluation into an alphanumeric and generally 
understandable classification. For instance, Moody’s methodology to assess credit risk is 
reported as an example in the following figure. 
In particular, the picture captures the part of the guidance they published in 2017 where 
Moody’s Investor Services explained how the build the grid with the alphanumeric evaluation. 
The one reported refers to how evaluate a manufacturing corporation and, as we can see form 
the picture, they divide the construction of the evaluation in different factors, each of them 
contributes with its weight to the formulation of the final rating, then based on the firm–specific 
characteristics, a class is assigned and then average out with the other factor’s assignments. 
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2.2.1 Moody’s example 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: How Moody’s Investor Service assess its grid. 
Source: Moody’s guideline 
 
 
 
Overall, ratings are traditionally classified into two categories (excluding default):  
 
I. Investment grade; 
II. Speculative grade.  
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Investment grade securities are those with rating BBB- or better, i.e. the safest securities. 
Speculative grade securities are those below BBB-, also known as “high yield” or “junk”.10  
Figure 2.2 reports the rating class for the major three Rating Agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Issuer and issue of rating class. 
 
 
 
Agencies often modify ratings within the same rating class to provide a better definition of 
relative credit quality: for example, Moody’s modifies the Baa category into Baa1, Baa2, and 
Baa3. Standard and Poor and Fitch modify the BBB class into BBB+, BBB and BBB-. Similar 
modifications are applied to the other classes. 
 
Depending on the rating class assigned, for example a risk–averse investor may opt to buy a 
AAA–rated municipal bond. In contrast, a risk–seeking investor may buy a bond with a lower 
rating in exchange for potentially higher returns. 
 
 
 
 
10 Iannotta G. (2010). Investment Banking: a guide to underwriting and advisory services, Springer Heidelberg 
Dordrecht London New York. 
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2.3 Literature hypotheses 
 
Ones is ascertained how to calculate credit risk, banks have to face it. One possibility, as we 
said several times, is the Credit Default Swap. It should be used, at least in theory, as hedging 
instrument in order to deal with this type of risk. The problem, following the past literature, is 
that, as opposed as we expect, the instrument is used for the most disparate motives and only 
sometimes its original intention is exploited. 
We describe all the several uses that have been made of the instrument by studying past 
literature on the theme and then we focus only a bit here, but more in the following Chapter, in 
particular on the ones we decided to analyze. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Credit enhancement 
 
Under the credit enhancement hypothesis, banks can offer credit support in transactions they 
underwrite, as the ability to hedge through CDS can increase the supply of credit to firms and 
other counterparties by making corporate debts more attractive to a broad group of investors 
that are unwilling to hold credit risk. More specifically, the credit enhancement hypothesis 
predicts that the amount of Credit Default Swap protection that a bank has sold on a 
counterparty is positively correlated with its lending exposure to that counterparty11. 
 
 
 
Results 1 
 
Minton et al. (2008) pointed out this hypothesis and they found support in their work. Their 
results show that the coefficient they called “has lending exposure”, meaning that a bank has 
an exposure toward a reference entity, is positive and statistically significant in all their 
specifications. This positive coefficient suggests that banks with syndicated lending exposure 
to a counterparty tend to sell more Credit Default Swap protection on this counterparty 
compared with banks without such exposures. 
 
11 Minton B. A., Stulz R. and Williamson R. (2008). How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives  to Hedge 
Loans?, Springer, J Finan Serv Res 35:1–31. 
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Consequently, this result provides supporting evidence for the credit enhancement 
hypothesis, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Summary results of the regression to test the credit enhancement hypothesis. 
Source: Minton et al. (2008) 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Relationship banking hypothesis 
 
Even in this case we exploit the studied made by Minton et al. (2008) on that relationship. 
This hypothesis want to examine whether the preexisting relationship between a bank and a 
counterparty affects how the bank buys or sells Credit Default Swaps on that counterparty.  
In their contest, i.e. analyzing syndicated loans, they construct two variables to measure the 
banking relationship.  
The first variable is “agent lender”, a dummy variable used to examine if a firm’s agent 
lender is different from other lenders when buying and selling Credit Default Swap on a firm. 
The second variable, “lender–borrower utilization ratio”, calculates the total amount that a firm 
has already borrowed from the bank divided by the bank’s total lending commitments to that 
firm. A high utilization ratio indicates that the firm relies heavily on the bank. The lender–
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borrower utilization ratio thus provides another measure of the banking relationship between a 
bank and a firm.12 
 
 
 
Results 2 
 
The coefficient of “agent lender” is positive and statistically significant in regressions of 
bought and net Credit Default Swap suggesting that a bank tends to buy more Credit Default 
Swap protection on a firm if it is the agent of that firm. In addition, the coefficient of  “agent 
lender” is also positive in all regressions of sold CDS positions and is statistically significant 
in most regressions, indicating that a firm’s agent lender also tends to sell more CDS protection 
on that firm. 
Finally, the coefficient of “lender–borrower utilization ratio” is negative and statistically 
significant, implying that a bank tends to refrain from buying or selling Credit Default Swap 
on a firm if that firm relies heavily on the bank for its banking needs. Overall, they find mixed 
evidence for the relationship banking hypothesis. Although a firm’s agent lender tends to buy 
more Credit Default Swap protection on that firm, they also find that banks refrain from buying 
or selling Credit Default Swap on firms that rely heavily on them for banking. 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Firm risk 
 
Another hypothesis studied is that, other thing being equal, banks are more likely to hedge 
their credit exposures when the counterparty is a riskier one (Aldasoro et al., 2017).  
They use as a proxy of the firm’s riskiness their 5 year Credit Default Swap market spreads. 
The idea that exposures to riskier firms are more likely to be hedged seems intuitive. 
Thus, essentially this hypothesis argue that banks insure a larger share of their exposure to 
relatively riskier counterparty.13 
 
 
12 Minton B. A., Stulz R. and Williamson R. (2008). How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives  to Hedge 
Loans?, Springer, J Finan Serv Res 35:1–31. 
13 Aldasoro I. and Barth A. (2017). Syndicated loans and CDS positioning, BIS Working Papers, Monetary 
and Economic Department, No. 679, December. 
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Results 3 
 
 In line with the expectation of the hypothesis their result pointed out that banks in their 
sample are more likely to hedge their credit risk exposure toward riskier counterparty. Indeed, 
the coefficient they create (which we will use forward in the analysis) the “Uninsured Loan 
Ratio”, i.e. the portion of the loan that remains uninsured by a Credit Default Swap contract, is 
smaller, the largest is the market CDS quote of the counterparty. This, in fact, suggests that 
banks insure more the riskier is the exposure. Figure 2.4 reports this evidence and the variable 𝐶𝐷𝑆$,&'( stands for the lagged CDS market quotes of the counterparty. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Example of past literature result.              
Source: Aldasoro et al. (2017) 
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2.3.4 Hypothesis 4: Private information hypothesis 
 
This section reflects on the hypothesis that a bank’s private information about the credit 
quality of the counterparty will affect the trading on Credit Default Swaps toward that 
counterparty. 
The authors of the papers of the first and second hypothesis just presented, also consider that 
case by examining the coefficients of two variables that reflect the internal credit ratings that 
banks, with their means, do on counterparties: “Rating: special mention” and “Rating: 
classified”.  
Where “Rating: special mention” is a dummy and means that the assets where is posed the 
special mention, has a potential weakness that deserve management’s close attention. If left 
uncorrected, these potential weaknesses may result in further deterioration of the repayment 
prospects or in the institutions’ credit position in the future. Special mention assets are not 
adversely classified and do not expose institutions to sufficient risk to warrant adverse 
classification. 
On the contrary “Rating: classified” is an indicator that equals 1 if any facility of the firm 
has a classified rating (substandard, doubtful or loss). Which means we are in front of a risky 
asset.14 
 
 
 
Result 4 
 
The coefficient “Rating: classified” is positive and statistically significant in their regression. 
These results indicate that banks tend to acquire and sell more Credit Default Swap protection 
on a counterparty that results in the internal rating as is deteriorating its credit quality.   
On the contrary, considering the regression as net Credit Default Swap position, no longer 
the single position buy or sell but the two together, none of the coefficients of “Rating: special 
mention” and “Rating: classified” are statistically significant.  
Overall, this result is somewhat puzzling and may be due to the reputation risk arising from 
conflict of interest.  
Another aspect to take into consideration is that the agent lender, i.e. the variable presented 
in the outlined hypothesis above, may has superior private information about the borrower. In 
 
14 Meaning of the variables are presented in the appendix of Minton et al. (2008). 
 43 
addition, the lender–borrower utilization ratio may also contain private information about a 
borrower. Therefore, the coefficients of these variables may also reflect the effects of a bank’s 
private information about the counterparty.  
 
 
 
2.3.5 Hypothesis 5: Cross–border hedging 
 
An interesting feature analyzed in the past literature is the cross–border nature of both 
lending and Credit Default Swap data.  
It is sensible to believe that, after controlling for borrower specific characteristics, cross–
border, with the respect to the domestic loans, are more likely to be insured.  
Let’s consider, for instance, a situation where the bank has to grant a loan to two identical 
counterparties, one located in the same country of the bank and the other located in another 
country.  
Maybe for a sort of sentiment of familiarity, of somewhat that we perceived as known, we 
expect that the first loan is less likely to be insured, or at least insured for a little fraction, than 
the second one. This can be due for instance to more uncertainties related to cross–border 
lending, little knowledge of the operations and regulation that apply to the counterparty’s state 
of origin, less ability to monitor, less strength of relationship lending and other motivations like 
these.  
 
 
 
Result 5 
 
Results for this regression are peculiar. Indeed, the domestic loan dummy, turns out to be a 
negative and significant coefficient. 
This implies that, controlling for a series of bank characteristics and different fixed effects, 
banks are more likely to hedge their domestic loans relative to similar foreign loans, i.e. the 
opposite of what we expected from this type of regression.  
Thus, comparing a bank lending to two identical counterparties (including the same level of 
riskiness), the authors find that the loan to the domestic firm is hedged to a larger extent with 
the respect to loans granted to foreign counterparties. This could point out, as the law of 
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diversifying portfolio does, that banks attempt to overcome their home bias, diversifying out, 
thus granting loans abroad. 
 
 
 
2.3.6 Hypothesis 6: Asymmetric information externalities 
 
When talking about syndicated loans is possible to encounter also problems of asymmetric 
information and Aldasoro et al. (2017) pointed it out. The structure of syndicated loans, where 
a lead arranger bank is in charge of establishing the relation with the borrower, negotiating and 
setting up the loan contract, monitoring, screening and other mansion that are part of their 
relationship, naturally leads to such problems.  
As we considered in the fourth hypothesis the agent has sensible information and thereby 
have incentives to misrepresent the quality of the loan, creating in this way adverse selection 
problem.  
Furthermore, when retaining smaller shares of the loan, lead arrangers also have an incentive 
to underperform in the monitoring of the loan, i.e. a moral hazard concern explores issues of 
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers in the syndicated loan market and finds 
that, consistent with moral hazard concerns, lead arrangers retain a larger share of the loan.  
This can be a way to mitigate asymmetric information concerns by providing direct evidence 
of a commitment to monitor via skin in the game.  
 
However, Parlour C. A. and Winton A. (2013), noted that a bank after making a loan, check 
out if the loan needs contract enforcement, such as monitoring; it also decides whether to lay 
off credit risk in order to release costly capital.  
Actually, a bank can lay off credit risk by either selling the loan or by buying insurance 
through a Credit Default Swap.  
With a Credit Default Swap, the originating bank retains the loan’s control rights but no 
longer has an incentive to monitor.  
To the contrary, with loan sales, control rights pass to the buyer of the loan, who can then 
monitor, albeit in a less–informed manner.15 
 
15 Parlour C. A. and Winton, A. (2013). Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 107:25{45. 
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Given the Over The Counter (OTC) nature of the market, lead arrangers may thus have an 
incentive to tap this market, anonymously shed the credit risk arising from their loan share and, 
thereby, void the informational value of their loan share commitment.  
However, such massive OTC protection buying, easily may lead to exacerbate information 
asymmetry problems. To summarize, this hypothesis they want to test if lead arrangers buying 
more protection, can have the deteriorating effect of increase problems of asymmetric 
information. 
 
 
 
Result 6 
 
Authors find negative and significant coefficient for the lead arranger dummy. In line with 
the hypothesis they find, by comparing a lead–arranger bank with one that it is not, the lead–
arranger tends to acquire more net protection. 
However, the fact that in OTC all happen anonymously it should allow at the same time to 
“anonymously” reduce credit risk. 
 
 
 
Regulatory capital relief and hedging hypothesis 
Finally, with this last two hypotheses we get into our main focus. Indeed, this two represent 
the hypotheses we want to test in the empirical part of this work, and we will go through them, 
explaining how we implement them in the next Chapter, here instead, we report how papers 
from which we get inspiration, worked on the theme. 
 
 
 
2.3.7 Hypothesis 7: Regulatory capital relief 
 
The regulatory capital relief hypothesis postulates that banks create deals such that allow 
them to reduce the capital needed in order to satisfy the regulators. In particular, Credit Default 
Swap bought and net position CDS (i.e. sold minus bought), are negatively correlated with its 
regulatory capital ratio. 
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The main indicator of the regulatory capital ratio is the Tier 1, that as presented above, 
indicates the best quality capital that banks have as deposit. 
Hedging through Credit Default Swap, actually, has a countereffect that is it will increase a 
bank’s regulatory capital ratio. In other words, we face a reverse causality problem between the 
net CDS position and the regulatory capital ratio, since the two contemporaneously affect one 
the other.  
Although, is less likely that a change in the Credit Default Swap position on a single 
counterparty will significantly affect a bank's capital ratio the paper, and also us in our paper, 
solve the problem by considering the dependent variable measured at time 𝑡 and the explanatory 
variables measured at time 𝑡 − 1, in this way the reverse causality is not a concern. 
 
In any case, there is a limitation in the use of this type of strategy since if the bank does not 
have any lending exposure toward a specific counterparty, for instance “Company A”, it cannot 
use the Credit Default Swap instrument bought on the Company A to obtain regulatory capital 
relief. In this situation no shift in the internal rating of that company is made, thus there couldn’t 
be a reduction, in favor of the bank, in the capital needed to insure from the credit risk that the 
company can carry with it. 
For this reason, Minton et al. (2008) exclude, in their work, observations of all bank–
counterparty pairs in which the bank has no lending exposure. 
 
 
 
Result 7 
 
Consistently, with the regulatory capital relief hypothesis, they find that banks with lower 
regulatory capital ratios tend to buy more Credit Default Swap protection.16 
Completely different are the result obtained in Aldasoro et al. (2017) that use, instead, a 
broad European sample and find out no support for the capital relief hypothesis in their 
regression, whereby, Minton et al. (2008) have used an American sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Minton B. A., Stulz R. and Williamson R. (2008). 
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2.3.8 Hypothesis 8: Hedging hypothesis 
 
Under the hedging hypothesis, one would expect that a bank’s amount of CDS bought and 
the net positions on them, be positively correlated with the bank’s lending exposure to that 
counterparty. Indeed, the higher is the exposure, thereby the risk coming from that counterparty, 
the more banks should be worried about that and attempts to hedge their positions. 
The estimation method in Minton et al. (2008) is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with 
bank, firm, and time fixed effects. In their analysis they both consider bank with and without a 
lending exposure versus counterparty (for them are all firms). 
The dependent variable is “bought CDS position”, which is the notional amount of CDS 
protection that a bank has bought on a firm at time 𝑡. The explanatory variables are observed at 
previous time, i.e. at time 𝑡 − 1 and the key one for this type of regression is “has lending 
exposure”. Which is equal to 1 if the bank was a lender in the period considered to the firm and 
zero otherwise. 
All their regressions include bank fixed effects to control for unobserved time–invariant 
bank–level factors, firm fixed effects to control for unobserved time–invariant firm–level 
factors, and time fixed effects to control for the combined effects of observed and unobserved 
macroeconomic factors. 
 
 
 
Result 8 
 
Testing this hypothesis, they find mixed evidence. Banks with lending exposures to a 
counterparty tend to buy and sell more Credit Default Swap on that counterparty, but there is 
no significant difference in net Credit Default Swap positions on a specific counterparty 
between banks that have or do not have a lending exposure. Moreover, counterintuitively, the 
net notional amount of Credit Default Swap protection that a bank has bought on a firm covers 
only a tiny fraction of its lending exposure to that firm, instead as explained in presenting the 
hypothesis, a bank with a higher exposure should, in theory, be more protected from that 
counterparty credit risk. 
 
Also, Hasan and Wu in 2016 studied this phenomenon and in that case the coefficient of 
lending exposure turns out to be positive and statistically significant in all regressions made, 
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suggesting that banks with higher lending exposures to a counterparty, tend to have higher net 
Credit Default Swap positions on that firm. Although this positive coefficient, which is 
consistent with the hedging hypothesis, also in that case, its magnitude is very small. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3 Data 
 
In this Chapter, the empirical results are going to be presented and analyzed, considering 
both the two main strategies: hedging and capital relief instrument. We make comparison of 
different results depending on the type of the specifications done.  
 
 
 
3.1 Objective 
 
Our analysis aims to obtain insights regarding the motivation of the bank to hedge or 
speculate and to relief capital from the mandatory requirements imposed by the capital 
regulators. In particular, constructing our dataset we want to get an idea of how banks exploit 
the renowned Credit Default Swap instrument in their businesses. To clear off correlation from 
third factors, we apply panel regressions and a series of Fixed effects (i.e. Within Group and 
Between Effect) and Random Effects model that allow us to control for time–varying bank and 
reference entity–specific characteristics. 
 
 
 
3.2 Dataset 
 
We create our dataset by combining different sources and match them by hand on an Excel 
file. We can split into three macro–argument the type of information that we need to conduct 
our analysis. First, The CDS notional amounts that banks buy and sell over the time–span 
considered; second, the size of the loans provided to their customer, either corporates and other 
banks loans; third, general bank–specific information such as Tier 1 ratio, performance and 
size. 
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Our sample is a country–specific dataset, focused on Italy, it contains eight major banks 
which are the results of an accurate selection. Indeed, we exclude all the non–CDS active banks 
and the ones for which, at least at the time of the collection of the data, some information needed 
was not available. 
 
The eight banks are: 
Þ Intesa Sanpaolo; 
Þ UniCredit S.p.A.; 
Þ UBI Banca; 
Þ Monte dei Paschi di Siena; 
Þ Banca Nazionale del Lavoro; 
Þ Banco Popolare di Milano; 
Þ Mediobanca S.p.A.; 
Þ BPER Banca. 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Loans and bonds 
 
We retrieve data for “Due from banks” (loans given to other banks) reading year–by–year 
our bank’s balance sheets; more, whenever possible, we exploit the dataset Thomson Reuters 
Eikon which provides the division for segments of activity for each bank and specify, among 
the loans to customers, the amount referred to corporate loans, otherwise if not specified, we 
source by hand on the Footnotes in Part L; lastly, a bit more complicated, is quantify the 
magnitude of government bonds the banks buy to finance the Italian debt.  
In that case, analyzing carefully the annual reports we find out this type of information 
reported in Part B of the Footnotes under the captions “Financial assets held for trading”, 
“Financial assets designated at fair value”, “Financial assets measured at amortized cost” and 
“Hedging derivatives” in the breakdown by borrower/issuer we isolate only the government 
bonds and sum up for each bank and year the four captions.  
Every single caption report under points 1.a. and 1.b. debt securities versus government, 
central banks and public administration, except for year 2018 where we exclude point 1.a. 
because it becomes only debt security versus central banks.  
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Further, we assume that all values reported under these captions, refer to Italy and Italian 
government bonds so that we could even find a third type of exposure for which a protection 
instrument is relevant.  
One feature, that is worth noting here, is that we move from the Banking book (as for data 
about credit from banks and corporates) to the Trading book for collecting data concerning the 
relationship between Italian banks and sovereign. 
The table reports, as an example, the summarized amounts in thousands of euro for Intesa 
Sanpaolo. 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Sample of loan’s notional amount for Intesa Sanpaolo. 
 
 
 
3.2.2 CDS notional amounts 
 
We obtain Credit Default Swap notional amounts data from the bank’s annual report, we 
search on Part E of the Footnotes for each bank and year. In this way we have information on 
the amount of Credit Default Swap (CDS) bought from any protection seller and sold to any 
protection buyer, but no information is given regarding who is the reference entity toward which 
the protection is bought or sold.  
We solve this problem by making an assumption: we know the amount of the protection that 
each bank buy or sell (from/to central counterparty, banks, other financial institution and 
corporates), we know the amount of the loans given to other banks, corporate and sovereign 
(although when we talk about sovereign we refer to government bonds, not loans, as specified 
above), the only missing information is which are the reference entities toward which the 
protection is needed, thus we assume that the amount bought and sold can be divided, 
proportionally to the size of the corresponding loans, between sovereign, banks and corporate, 
respectively.  
Indeed, for instance, looking at Intesa Sanpaolo, as the Table 3.2 shows, it has bought 
20˙978€ millions of CDS, in 2018, from Central Counterparty (CCP), as reported in the 
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Footnotes, then we assume that ,- is used as protection from the reference entities “state” and 
“corporate”, respectively; (. for the reference entity “banks”. The proportions are in line with 
the amount of exposure versus state, banks and corporate. They may differ from one bank to 
the other. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Sample of CDS protection bought and sold for Intesa Sanpaolo for years  
2017–2018. 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Bank–specific information 
 
Lastly, general information on bank’s performances, size (approximated as the natural 
logarithm of the total assets)17, ROA (Return on Assets, i.e. Net Income/Total Assets), Tier 1 
 
17 See Aldasoro I. and Barth A. (2017). 
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ratio, Leverage and other indicators, are obtained from annual report; if not directly available, 
compute them by hand. 
Sometimes we exploit also information given by Thomson Reuters Eikon since it proposes 
some useful segmentation that we can use without further modification, e.g. the Tier 1 ratio is 
directly readable in there. 
 
 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 
 
With the structure of the data in mind, we now recall and formulate the two main hypotheses 
that will be tested in the empirical analysis. These represent the research question of the study: 
Is a CDS used by banks as hedge or capital relief instrument?  
 
 
 
3.3.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Hedging instrument 
 
Our first hypothesis explores the most basic dimension relating to bank's health and its 
hedging behavior. In particular, we posit that weaker banks will on average insure a smaller 
share of their exposures. In our analysis, weaker banks will be those scoring relatively poorly 
on risk (highly leveraged banks) and profitability (low return on assets). Cast in this way, the 
hypothesis can also be linked to a charter value argument, even though we do not actually 
compute charter values for the banks in our sample.  
More precisely, lower charter values (associated to weaker banks) decrease the incentives 
for a bank to ensure its lending business, i.e. the circumstance that the threat of losing future 
rents is less severe might act as a deterrent to insure loan activities. Hypothesis 1 summarizes 
this conjecture. 
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Þ Hypothesis 1 (Hedging behavior): Ceteris paribus, weaker (stronger) banks tend to 
insure less (more). 
 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Capital relief 
 
In our second hypothesis, we argue that, under certain conditions, bank capital regulation 
allows banks to reduce the risk weights attached to some of their credit risk exposures by buying 
protection from a counterparty that has a better credit rating than the entity to which the bank 
is originally exposed to. That is, Credit Default Swaps can be used for capital relief purposes. 
Indeed, this instrument acts as a mitigator exploited by banks in order to, artificially, satisfy the 
mandatory requirements by the regulator.  
Discover this type of strategies is pretty hard but under this capital relief hypothesis, we 
expect that banks that are in a weaker position in terms of their risk–weighted regulatory capital 
ratios (i.e. Tier 1 ratio) have a greater incentive than their better capitalized peers to buy Credit 
Default Swap protection on their credit risk exposures in order to lower the capital requirement 
implied by their lending portfolios.  
We decide to use the Tier 1 capital ratio (Tier 1 Capital/RWA) for measuring the bank capital 
adequacy, because compared with the total capital which, instead, includes reserves, general 
provisions and subordinated term debt, Tier 1 capital is a better measure of core capital and 
thus a core measure of a bank’s financial strength.  
As in Hasan et al. (2016) and Aldasoro et al. (2017) this hypothesis requires a negative 
correlation between net CDS positions (which is the difference between instrument acquired 
and sold) and the regulatory capital. This hypothesis also speaks to the vast literature on the 
relationship between bank capital and risk aversion. 
 
Þ Hypothesis 2 (Capital relief): Ceteris paribus, banks with lower regulatory capital, 
i.e. low percentage of Tier 1 ratios have stronger incentives to hedge their credit risk 
exposures for capital relief purposes, in order to comply with the mandatory 
regulation about capital requirements. 
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3.3.2 Empirical approach 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Our empirical work tries to explain the portion of loans of bank 𝑖 to counterparty 𝑗 (where 𝑗 
could be firm, state or other banks) that remains uninsured at time 𝑡 (therefore	𝑈𝐿𝑅5$&, stands 
for Uninsured Loan Ratio). In order to calculate this share, we first organize the data by bank, 
year and protection bought and sold, then we calculate the net notional amount of CDS 
protection on reference entity 𝑗 (where it is again 𝑗 = corporate, government and other banks) 
by bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 as the difference between the sum of bank 𝑖's Credit Default Swap protection 
bought on reference entity 𝑗 from any protection seller 𝑘 (𝑘 =central counterparty, banks, other 
financial institution and corporate) and the aggregate amount of bank 𝑖 's Credit Default Swap 
protection sold on reference entity 𝑗 to any protection buyer 𝑘. 
 
Thus,  
 𝑁𝐸𝑇	𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿	𝐶𝐷𝑆	𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆5$& = @𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿	𝐶𝐷𝑆	𝐵𝑂𝑈𝐺𝐻𝑇5$,B −@𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿	𝐶𝐷𝑆	𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐷5$,BBB  
 
 
Now we have a measure of the net position on the CDS for every single bank on the specific 
reference entity. 
Subsequently, obtain the variable Uninsured Loan Ratio as the difference between the loans 
from bank 𝑖 to the reference entity 𝑗 at time 𝑡 and the new measure just calculated, the net 
notional CDS holdings of bank 𝑖 to the reference entity 𝑗 at time 𝑡, then normalized for the 
corresponding loan amount. 
  
 𝑈𝐿𝑅5$& = 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁	𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺5$& − 𝑁𝐸𝑇	𝑁𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿	𝐶𝐷𝑆	𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆5$&𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁	𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺5$&  
  
 
If 𝑈𝐿𝑅5$& = 1, then bank 𝑖 does not buy or sell (on net) protection on reference entity 𝑗 at 
time 𝑡. 
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Values of 𝑈𝐿𝑅5$&	grater than 1 indicate that the bank is doubling–up on its credit risk 
exposure, whereas value of 𝑈𝐿𝑅5$& smaller than 1 indicate the bank is (at least partly) hedging 
the loan exposure.  𝑈𝐿𝑅5$& can indeed take negative values as Figure 3.1 shows the example of our sample case, 
which would imply over–insurance on the part of the bank (i.e. buy net protection on reference 
entity 𝑗 over and above the loan exposure among the three different counterparties). 
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Figure 3.1: Relative frequency of the uninsured loan ratio (ULR). 
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3.4 Model 
 
We test the two hypotheses in a regression where we infer the Uninsured Loan Ratio 
connecting bank 𝑖 with the reference entity 𝑗 at time 𝑡 to a function of bank characteristic, at 
the same time, controlling for bank–specific and reference entity feature. We also control for 
bank–specific time–constant effects. 
 
The baseline specification is therefore given by: 
 𝑈𝐿𝑅5$& = 𝛼5 + 𝛽(𝐿𝐸𝑉5& + 𝛽G𝑅𝑂𝐴5& + 𝛽,𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅15& + 𝛽.𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸5& + 𝜀5$& 
 
For the specification of the Uninsured Loan Ratio that refers to the government bonds, we 
can include in the regression a measure of the riskiness of this type of exposure. In particular, 
we use as a proxy of the state riskiness, the BTP–BUND spread calculated year–by–year as the 
average of the monthly basis point spread reported and downloaded from the website 
“investing.com”.  
However, we cannot find data before year 2007 thus we assume that for the three years from 
2007 to 2004, it remains at a low level between 20 and 10 basis point. This assumption is 
supported by the awareness that in that period the infamous spread was almost unknown to the 
majority, only the expertise in the sector were aware of the instrument. 
 
The following plot represents the relationship between the BTP–BUND spread and the 
uninsured loans ratio of sovereign. 
 
 60 
 
Plot 3.1: Scatterplot of uninsured loans ratio of the state and BTP—BUND spread. 
 
 
 
The same implementation cannot be extended to the other two specifications because we 
would need the CDS spread of all the single reference entity but given the assumption that we 
made we are not able to retrieve such information. We take the value of the loans to corporate 
and other banks as a whole since we do not have deeply and specify information about which 
corporate or banks are there behind those loans. Consequently, we consider exposure to 
corporate as a unique reference entity. 
Thus, when we talk about government bonds, therefore when the reference entity is the 
sovereign, the specification becomes: 
 𝑈𝐿𝑅5$& = 𝛼5 + 𝛽(𝐿𝐸𝑉5& + 𝛽G𝑅𝑂𝐴5& + 𝛽,𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅15& + 𝛽.𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸5& + 𝛽J𝐵𝑇𝑃_𝐵𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑&+ 𝜀5$& 
 
 
In this way, we control also for time–varying riskiness of the instrument. 
Specifically, 𝐿𝐸𝑉5& captures the leverage of the bank 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, which is calculated as 
the end–year total assets divided by the contemporaneous value of equity; 𝑅𝑂𝐴5& gives 
information about the bank 𝑖 in the year 𝑡 performance and it’s the ratio between net profit or 
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loss and total assets; moreover, 𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅15& captures bank's financial strength, it is the regulatory 
capital ratio computed as equity capital and disclosed reserves over its total risk–weighted 
assets. It is a key measure that has been adopted as part of the Basel III Accord on bank 
regulation.  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸5&, gives an idea of the dimension of the several banks and is the result of the natural 
logarithm of the year–end total assets. These are in brief described the main explanatory 
variables that we use in running our regression model. 
However, all the details of the regression (i.e. the R code) are presented in the Appendix A. 
 
Under Hypothesis 1, we expect 𝛽, to be positive, i.e. lower regulatory capital values should 
be associated with a larger share of the credit exposure being insured. Based on Hypothesis 2, 
we expect the coefficients to be positive when looking at bank risk measure so to the leverage 
parameter (𝛽( > 0) and negative when considering the bank’s profitability 𝛽G < 0, thus to the 
return on assets.  
 
Here is presented the head of the data we create to implement the analysis, in particular Table 
3.3 shows the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) example sorted for the period from 2004 to 
2017 (which, actually, continue up the year 2018), with all its explanatory and dependent 
variables for the several specifications. 
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Table 3.3: Example of dataset used. 
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3.5 Results 
 
Having in mind the main assumptions, hypothesis and how results should look like in order 
to consider Credit Default Swap either hedging or a capital relief instrument, we have a look at 
the main outcomes. 
 
 
 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Our sample contains 8 Italian banks lending to several different firms and banks, we obtain 
fourteen years data from 2004 to 2018.  
All 8 banks are active on CDS’s market in the sense that the bank should have, at least for 
one time bought or sold a Credit Default Swap. Banks are also an active provider of loans and 
contributor in financing the Italian public debt. 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Dependent variables 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics for dependent variables. 
 
 
 
For banks exposures against sovereign, we observe an average share of Uninsured Loans 
Ratio (ULR) of 68.88%, the lowest between the three specifications. Moreover, is the only case 
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where, on average, banks have a ULR lower than one which means that Italian banks partially 
hedge the exposures they have over the government.  
On the contrary, in the other two cases, banks seem to double their credit exposures since 
the Uninsured Loans Ratios are on average a little more than 1 (or equivalently a little more 
than a 100%; i.e. 102.32% and 101.52% respectively).  
Actually, following this evidence and given the hedging hypothesis, it would seem that our 
financial intermediaries are more confident about corporates and other banks reliability, rather 
than the Italian government solvency in repaying its debt obligations; which appears a quite 
realistic result. 
However, the lowest value of ULR is reached by Monte dei Paschi di Siena in 2007 in 
lending money to the Italian government; while the highest value occurred in 2008 when 
Mediobanca gave loans to other banks, which clearly demonstrate that this bank, at that time, 
felt other bank’s soundness and robustness. 
Notice here that ULR_state variable, in Figure 3.3, presents 15 NAs which are all accounted 
to Mediobanca because we do not find any acquisition of government bonds in the bank balance 
sheet, that in turn make the Uninsured Loans Ratio incalculable. 
 
 
 
3.5.3 Explanatory variables 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics for explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
Leverage is defined as the ratio between total year–end bank assets over the 
contemporaneous equity and its average level in our sample is about 14.3. The bank that shows 
the highest leverage (i.e. 34.6) is Monte dei Paschi di Siena in year 2012 and the lower is 
Mediobanca in 2007. 
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The average balance sheet size of banks in our sample amounts to (in logs) 12.18, with the 
largest bank in our sample being UniCredit and the bank with the smallest amounts of total 
assets being BPER Banca. 
Moreover, the minimum of the BTP–BUND spread is reached in the years were first came 
to our attention, thus in years 2004–2005 then started growing up, picking its maximum in year 
2012 (we remember that this measure is the result of an average of the monthly basis point 
which is an average itself; thus it maybe that there were historically higher or lower values than 
the ones reported but given the calculation of the variable by means of the arithmetic mean, 
those extreme values are averaged out).   
Finally, concerning the profitability, banks in our sample have on average positive return on 
total assets but again Monte dei Paschi di Siena in year 2014 picked the minimum of minus 
3.001; whereas looking to the regulatory capital we find an average of 9.878% of Tier 1 ratio 
which is tiny higher than the mandatory requirements but in several circumstances the 
requirement was not satisfied, indeed the minimum is 4.7%.   
 
 
 
3.6 Working environment 
 
The entire project implementation has been performed in the Software RStudio. We attempt 
a panel regression analysis and carry out a series of Fixed effects (i.e. Within Group and 
Between Effect) and Random Effects panel regressions of the model above presented.  
In the Appendix A, as yet specified, there are all the details of the R code used to perform 
the empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
3.7 Main regression outcomes 
 
We now provide regression outcomes for the two hypotheses outlined. We absorb all time 
constant bank factors by including bank fixed effects as well as all factors that are constant for 
all loans by including time fixed effects.  
In a Random Effects Model, we do not assume that the effects of the time invariant variables, 
such as bank and counterparty, are the same and allow them to have their own starting values 
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(i.e. intercepts). In this model, the R code is almost identical, except that in the model section 
we change Within to Random.  
The WG (within group) estimator requires strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables with 
the respect to the error term but allows for correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the individual effect. 
The Within Group estimator takes deviations from group means (individual) for all 
variables. The two estimators, Random and Within, require weaker conditions to be considered 
consistent with the respect to the Random Effect. 
Indeed, for the Within Group the needed conditions are: 
• Strict exogeneity, i.e. 𝔼[𝜀5&|𝑋5Z] = 0;	∀𝑡, 𝑠 where the X’s are the explanatory 
variables and 𝑠 identifies a time–period 𝑠 ≤ 𝑡.  
• Moreover, the individual effect in the model may correlates with the explanatory 
variables. 
 
For the Random Effect the conditions to be met are the following: 
• Strict exogeneity, i.e. 𝔼[𝜀5&|𝑋5Z] = 0;	∀𝑡, 𝑠. 
• The individual effect in the model cannot correlates with the explanatory variables 
differently from before. 
 
Then we get the value of the parameter estimate, which is the average change in ULR over 
time between banks. 
 
Þ Hypothesis 1: Hedging/speculating behavior. Results for our first hypothesis and 
specification, i.e. Credit Default Swap as protection against government bonds 
riskiness, are now presented.  
Essentially, the concept is that healthier banks tend to insure larger shares of their 
loan exposures. First, the script in Figure 3.2 shows the outcomes of the Within 
Model regression. 
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Figure 3.2: Results of Within Model regression for sovereign exposures. 
 
 
 
Among all the coefficients, we find only the negative estimate of ROA as a 
statistically significant coefficient, in particular it is significant at 0.1% level, which 
indicates that more profitable banks insure more often their loans than less profitable 
banks.  
Note, furthermore, that each independent variable is lagged by one period. For the 
regressions on the second and third model (Random Effect and Between Models, 
respectively in Figure 3.3 and 3.4), some sign reverses compared to our first 
regression.  
The coefficient ROA remains negative in the Random Effect but turns positive in the 
Between Model contradicting our first result, but this time is not statistically 
significant. In addition, in the Between Model leverage and Tier 1 ratio estimates 
become negative. No one throughout all the coefficients results statistically 
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significant despite, within the three used for this type of exposures, it is the model 
with the highest R squared indicator. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Results of Random Effect Model for sovereign exposures. 
 
 
 
Generally, these outcomes are in line with our original expectation, except for the 
fact that in our first definition of weaker bank we assumed the banks are “weak” if 
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they score relatively poorly on risk (highly leveraged banks) and profitability (low 
return on assets), thus one condition is met (i.e. the results on the estimate of the 
return on assets) the other not.  
Since we assumed that all banks in our sample have a lending exposures toward the 
three macro–category of counterparties that we created, we cannot follow the 
analysis made by Minton et al. (2008) that namely make a distinction between banks 
with and without a lending exposure to test the hedging hypothesis; for this reasons 
we think that this ambiguous result, in reality, is quite a common phenomenon. In 
this way we mean that the leverage is yet a fundamental indicator since banks need, 
always, to be well capitalised to tackle any crisis situation, but it doesn’t tell, at any 
time, which is the actual riskiness level of the bank/firm. 
Leverage ratio may be misleading sometimes given the fact that a firm or a bank can 
have a high level of indebtedness, but it may be investing in a good project that have 
a positive return only in the future.  
At the moment of the evaluation the bank results risky but in reality if it is a good 
investment, it’ll turn out as a profitable one.   
Leverage coefficient is sometimes positive whereas it should be positive in order to 
support our hypothesis but, however it is never statically significant in this first 
specification, so we are quite confident in asserting that weaker banks insure little of 
the exposures in government bonds using Credit Default Swaps. 
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Figure 3.4: Results of Between Model for sovereign exposures. 
 
 
 
However, in the following figures are presented all together the three models for the 
remaining two specifications (exposures against other banks and corporates).  
Figure 3.5 refers to the loans to other banks instead Figure 3.6 to loans to corporates. 
If we focus our attention on the results in Figure 3.5 we can notice that now the ROA 
estimates among the different methods is no longer negative, even the leverage 
estimate turns out only in one case negative but is not significant. Then in situation 
where the reference entities are other banks, we do not find support for the hedging 
hypothesis.  
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Figure 3.5: Results of Within Effect, Random Effect and Between Model for other 
banks exposures. 
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Thus, under this specification, the lender bank may not use Credit Default Swap as a 
hedging instrument given the same explanation proposed in the protection of 
exposures toward government bonds, or generally speaking, the state. These results 
are in contrast to those of Aldasoro et al. (2017), who use an analogous empirical 
design but a very different data set. They focus on a cross–country sample, they use 
different sample specification. The broadest includes 1˙022 European banks from 28 
countries, whereas the narrowest is composed by 142 banks with very different 
business models.  
To the contrary we focus only on 8 major banks. Indeed, we want to specify that 
concentrate our attention only on the Italian case, has its pro and cons since, certainty 
we made our own analysis that directly involves our daily life; but on the other side, 
it may be a limitation since by studying each bank’s balance sheet we notice that is 
not as common as instrument in Italy.  
However, the following graph represents the composition of the net CDS position, 
in particular it shows which are the major banks among the ones analyzed, that act 
in the Credit Default Swaps market. 
It is quite evident from Graphic 3.1 that the most influential actors are Intesa 
Sanpaolo and UniCredit, which together represent almost 80% of the total amount of 
CDS considered by us either bought or sold. 
Mediobanca, also has its good market’s fraction, indeed considering the three majors 
all together we reach the 90/95% of the total. 
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Graphic 3.1: Composition of Italian Credit Default Swaps protection bought and 
sold. 
 
 
 
This is a very crucial element in our analysis. Our research question focuses on 
establishing whether or not banks use CDS as capital relief and/or hedging 
instrument; but in order to have a complete framework of the situation we have to 
consider which is the worldwide relevance of what we find.     
Generally speaking, the same author of the paper from which we inspired our work 
has published on BIS website the quarterly review in June 2018 and its abstract 
reports the following sentences “Over the last decade, the size and structure of the 
global Credit Default Swap (CDS) market have changed markedly. With the help of 
the BIS derivatives statistics, we document how outstanding amounts have fallen, 
central clearing has risen, and the composition of underlying credit risk exposures 
has evolved. Netting of CDS contracts has increased, due to the combination of a 
higher share of standardized index products and the clearing of such contracts via 
central counterparties. In turn, this has led to a further reduction in counterparty 
risk.  
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Underlying credit risks have shifted towards sovereigns and portfolios of reference 
securities with better credit ratings. The distribution of credit risks across 
counterparty categories has remained broadly unchanged.”18     
Which outline the most recent changes in the Credit Default Swap market. With the 
data and the scenario just described in mind, we now look at Italy which has a 
peculiar pattern represented in the following Figure (amounts are in thousand €). 
From 2007 to 2011 CDS notional amounts of the eight Italian banks rapidly increased 
but then suddenly started its decline up 2017 and only in the last year it had a little 
recovery. 
 
 
 
18 Cit. from https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1806b.pdf – Aldasoro I. and Ehlers T., (2018). 
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Graphic 3.2: Italian CDS pattern from 2007 to 2018. 
 
 
 
Specifically, our Italian total notional amount in 2018 sum up to 167˙084˙306˙000.0€ 
that represents around 2.6% since as Table 1.1 in the previous Section shows, the 
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global notional amount in the second semester of year 2018 was 8˙143$ billion, 
which converted at 31 December 2018 exchange ratio it corresponds to 
7˙092˙553˙000˙000.0€. Thus, these are the numbers and relevance of what we are 
talking about. 
 
 
However, as shown in Figure 3.6 we obtain a positive and highly statistically 
significant coefficient for the bank’s regulatory capital which is related to the second 
hypothesis of capital relief. It is extremely significant in the random model and 
statistically significant at 0.1% and 5% levels in the other two regression models. 
Lastly, in the third specification we find a different scenario, where this time the 
coefficient of bank’s leverage remains always negative, as to ascertain the hedging 
strategy in using the Credit Default Swaps to insure exposure to firms but the return 
on assets coefficient is, on the contrary, always negative thus we don’t know which 
of the two estimates predominate.  
For these reasons we are not able to assert which is the actual use of this instrument, 
whether to hedge exposures or not. 
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Figure 3.6: Results of Within Effect, Random Effect and Between Model for 
corporate exposures. 
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Þ Hypothesis 2: Capital relief. Remembering that the bank capital accord (i.e. Basel 
accords) allows banks to apply a lower risk weight to the claims they hold if they use 
credit risk mitigants such as credit derivatives to hedge the credit risk exposure from 
a higher–rated counterparty. Or, put differently, credit derivatives allow banks to 
“rent” another institution’s credit rating to reduce its required capital19. 
Thus, now coming back to the previous figures we have a look at what is about the 
second hypothesis. As can also be seen in Figure 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we find support 
for the capital relief hypothesis in the first scenario where banks are exposed toward 
government bonds, expect in the between model although in that case the estimate is 
not statically significant. 
Plot 3.2 presents the relationship between Tier 1 ratio and the Uninsured Loans Ratio 
for the scenario just specified. 
 
 
 
Plot 3.2: Scatterplot of Uninsured Loans Ratio of the state and Tier 1 ratio. 
 
 
 
 
19 http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-32 
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Under the latter, one would expect to see banks with lower regulatory capital ratios 
having higher incentives to use the Credit Default Swaps market in order to hedge 
their credit risk exposures, thereby obtaining capital relief via a sort of risk–
weighting arbitrage.  
In the context of our empirical setting, this should translate into a positive coefficient 
for the Tier 1 ratio: higher regulatory capital ratios should be associated with a higher 
share of the loan being uninsured, thus higher ULR. 
 
Overall, these results, together with the ones obtained in the other two specification 
(protection toward other banks and corporates), are in line with our expectation, 
supporting our second hypothesis of capital relief strategy. Indeed, throughout all the 
specification, Tier 1 ratio coefficient seems to remain always positive and 
statistically significant in the two scenarios of exposures of banks toward other banks 
and corporates. 
Results are often highly statistically significant such as in the case of the two Random 
Effect regression model (one for CDS versus other banks and the other versus 
corporates), where the significance level are at 0%. 
In conclusion, one may argue that Italian banks use CDS to comply with the 
regulatory requirements and deceive regulators which become less effective than 
perceived. 
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However, we also run the Hausman test, which is a statistical hypothesis test, to evaluate the 
consistency of the estimator when compared to an alternative, less efficient estimator which is 
already known to be consistent.  
The Within Group (WG) estimator is consistent under weaker conditions than the Random 
Effect estimator, as specified above. 
However, the Random Effect estimator, when consistent, is more efficient than the WG 
estimator. The Random Effect estimator combines between groups variability with within–
group variability. Instead, the Within Group estimator, as its name suggests, uses only within–
group variability. 
Hence, to decide which estimator one should use, we can compute the Hausman test. We  
run the test for every regression we made, and we find out from the Hausman test for Within 
Model versus Random Effects Model the following p–values presented in Figure 3.7. Under 
the null hypothesis 𝐻_: Random Effect model is a better fit although even the Within Group is 
consistent, but it is inefficient; whereas under the alternative 𝐻(: Within Effect model is a better 
fit since the Random Effect estimator is, in that case, inconsistent. 
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Figure 3.7: Hausman test for Within Effect versus Random Effect Model. 
 
 
 
In the first scenario, where counterparty is sovereign the p–value is above 0.05 which means 
that Random Effect better summarizes the model rather than the Within Effect. In that case we 
accept the null hypothesis. 
To the contrary, in the other scenarios the results overturn and Random Effect become the 
worst available fit for the model analyzed, since turns out to be inconsistent and we refuse the 
null hypothesis. 
Now, moving toward the comparison between, again, the Random Effect model and the 
Between Effect we find out the same evidence. Indeed, for sovereign exposure, Random Effect 
seems fit better instead for corporate and other banks exposures, the alternative, that in this case 
is the Between Effect appears to be suitable for the analysis. 
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Figure 3.8: Hausman test for Random Effect Model versus Between Effect. 
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Conclusions  
 
Credit Default Swap is a recent financial innovation that has played a key role in the financial 
markets, especially in the subprime crisis phase. 
Opinions on that instrument are very contrasting, for some CDS represents a useful 
instrument that helps the users to keep under control the credit exposures and risks, for others 
it determines, a mean of pure speculation and a deterrent to avoid maintaining amount of 
reserves of capital as the Basel III requires. 
In this dissertation, starting from reviewing the Credit Default Swap contribution in the 
financial world, deepening the analysis by going through its relationship with banks, we want 
to perform our empirical work in the domestic context. 
We combine loans data from a group of bank’s balance sheets for each year, from 2004 to 
2018, with the notional amount of CDS bought and sold to the reference entity toward which 
the bank is exposed to; we use these data to construct a measure that represent the part of the 
loan not insured with a Credit Default Swap and then with this variable (i.e. our dependent 
variable) we run a Fixed Effect and Random Effect model regression. With this panel setting 
we aim to shed light on how banks use the CDS protection contract. 
We first investigate the relationship between bank’s health and the hedging behavior, in that 
case we proxy the soundness/health of the bank by looking into two main measures that are: 
the leverage ratio and the return on assets. Both indicators give us an idea of how bank is 
performing, therefore controlling for these variables we find not unique evidence on the 
hedging hypothesis.  
In particular, we segment the exposures into three macro–areas, the first concern about 
exposures toward government, the second toward other banks and the last one exposure versus 
corporates. In all the three specification, for what concern the hedging hypothesis we do not 
find clear evidence of this type of bank’s behavior. 
On the contrary, but in line with the previous literature (Hasan and Wu, 2016) we find 
support to the capital relief hypothesis, indeed we test whether or not the strategy of using credit 
derivatives to “rent” another counterparty’s credit rating, thus, to reduce bank’ required capital, 
is exploited also from our eight Italian’s banks. 
Moreover, having in mind the structure of how we implement our dataset, we want to 
highlight some aspects to take into consideration in future works, such as extend the analysis 
to an European sample may increase the accuracy of the results, test other hypothesis in order 
not to limit the possible explanation to give to some banks’ behavior or, more, try to have access 
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to platforms with deeper information about exposures and CDS–bank relationship in order to 
avoid making strong assumptions.  
However, if we focus on the results obtained in the empirical section, we are able to 
comments which may be the possible implication for our policy maker, banks and markets. 
Indeed, the evidence that there is support for the capital relief hypothesis, suggests negative 
implication for the policy maker and regulators which theoretically, have the objective to make 
things mandatory but, in reality, what happen is that banks bypass this regulation, in particular 
the one concerning the capital requirement. Banks, on the other hand, have less constraint in 
term of liquidity available, because they can use more capital than in the situation in which they 
cannot exploit the capital relief but, at the same time, they are paying continuously the premium. 
This condition may lead to an increase of the Credit Default Swap contract in circulation in 
the markets, the larger is the use the banks make to carry on this strategy. 
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Appendix A 
 
R Code 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
# Load data 
library(readxl) 
one_model <- read_excel("Desktop/one_model.xlsx") 
 
 
# Adjust data 
library(plm) 
one_model$BTP_BUND_spread<-as.integer(one_model$BTP_BUND_spread) 
one_model$bank<-as.factor(one_model$bank) 
 
str(one_model) 
head(one_model) 
table(one_model$bank, one_model$year) 
any(table(one_model$bank, one_model$year)!=1) 
 
 
# Transform data in panel 
library(plm) 
empirical_model<-pdata.frame(one_model) 
attach(empirical_model) 
Y<-cbind(ULR_state, ULR_banks, ULR_corporate) 
X<-cbind(LEV, ROA, TIER1, SIZE, BTP_BUND_spread) 
 
 
# Run the Fixed Effect model 
FE_state <- plm(ULR_state ~  alfa_i + lag(BTP_BUND_spread,1) + lag(LEV,1) + 
lag(ROA,1) + lag(TIER1,1) + lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, index = 
c("bank","year")) 
summary(FE_state) 
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30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
 
FE_banks <- plm(ULR_banks ~ alfa_i + lag(LEV,1) + lag(ROA,1) + lag(TIER1,1) + 
lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, index = c("bank","year")) 
summary(FE_banks) 
 
FE_corporate <- plm(ULR_corporate ~ alfa_i + lag(LEV,1) + lag(ROA,1) + 
lag(TIER1,1) + lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, index = c("bank","year")) 
summary(FE_corporate) 
 
 
# Run the Random Effect model 
RE_state <- plm(ULR_state ~ alfa_i + lag(BTP_BUND_spread,1) + lag(LEV,1) + 
lag(ROA,1) + lag(TIER1,1) + lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, model = 
"random") 
summary(RE_state) 
 
RE_banks <- plm(ULR_banks ~ alfa_i + lag(LEV,1) + lag(ROA,1) + lag(TIER1,1) + 
lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, model = "random") 
summary(RE_banks) 
 
RE_corporate <- plm(ULR_corporate ~ alfa_i + lag(LEV,1) + lag(ROA,1) + 
lag(TIER1,1) + lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, model = "random") 
summary(RE_corporate) 
 
 
# Run the Between Estimator 
BW_state <- plm(ULR_state ~ alfa_i + lag(BTP_BUND_spread,1) + lag(LEV,1) + 
lag(ROA,1) + lag(TIER1,1) + lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, model = 
"between") 
summary(BW_state) 
 
BW_banks <- plm(ULR_banks ~  lag(LEV,1) + lag(ROA,1) + lag(TIER1,1) + 
lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, model = "between") 
summary(BW_banks) 
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65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
 
 
BW_corporate <- plm(ULR_corporate ~ alfa_i + lag(LEV,1) + lag(ROA,1) + 
lag(TIER1,1) + lag(SIZE,1), data = empirical_model, model = "between") 
summary(BW_corporate) 
 
 
 
# Hausman test for fixed versus random effects model state 
phtest(RE_state,FE_state) 
 
# Hausman test for fixed versus random effects model banks 
phtest(RE_banks,FE_banks) 
 
# Hausman test for fixed versus random effects model corporate 
phtest(RE_corporate,FE_corporate) 
 
 
# Hausman test for between versus random effects model state 
phtest(RE_state,BW_state) 
 
# Hausman test for between versus random effects model banks 
phtest(RE_banks,BW_banks) 
 
# Hausman test for between versus random effects model corporate 
phtest(RE_corporate,BW_corporate) 
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